IS THINKING A MATTER OF KNOWING?

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Resumen

¿Hay requisitos epistemológicos para la posesión de conceptos? Aunque nuestra intuición apunta claramente a una relación muy estrecha entre condiciones de posesión de conceptos y ciertos tipos de conocimiento (principalmente, conocimiento del contenido de los conceptos relevantes), posiciones naturalistas en filosofía —como la defendida por Jerry Fodor— traen consigo una visión según la cual los conceptos que un sujeto posee son independientes metafísica y conceptualmente de las capacidades epistémicas de dicho sujeto. En este artículo argumentaré que, tal y como el análisis del dogmatismo de Pryor puede mostrar, las teorías de la justificación epistémica proporcionan, desde un punto de vista general, apoyo independiente a la idea intuitiva de requisitos epistemológicos para la posesión de conceptos. Por este motivo, las aproximaciones naturalistas a los conceptos harían bien en evitar condiciones de posesión que carezcan de compromisos epistemológicos.

Palabras clave: Condiciones de posesión, Atomismo Psicológico, Dogmatismo.

Abstract

Are possession conditions of concepts epistemologically constrained? Although intuition strongly recommends a very close link between possession conditions of concepts and certain kinds of knowledge (mainly, knowledge of the content of the relevant concepts), naturalizing trends in philosophy —such as the one defended by Jerry Fodor— bring with it a view according to which what concepts someone has is conceptually and metaphysically independent of what epistemic capacities she has. In the present paper I shall argue that, as an analysis of Pryor’s dogmatism can show, theories of epistemic warrant generally provide independent support to the intuitive conception of possession conditions as epistemologically constrained. Naturalizing approaches to concepts are then well advised to avoid epistemologically free possession conditions.

Keywords: Possession conditions, Psychological Atomism, Dogmatism.
1. The problem

In the present paper, I will concentrate on a very specific question, namely, whether possession conditions of concepts are epistemologically constrained. Usually, and from a Fregean or otherwise rationalist standpoint, this question has received a very straightforward answer: of course, possession conditions of concepts are not only epistemologically constrained, but indeed mainly epistemological. At an intuitive level, such an answer is perfectly reasonable. Consider, to put an example, the concept *animal*. To assume that somebody has that concept is to assume that she is able, at least to a certain degree, to know the content of *animal*, that is, that she knows, at least to a certain degree, what an animal is. For imagine somebody that is said to have the concept *animal* but who does not have a clue about what an animal is. As a consequence, she might come to embrace the thought or to believe that *irons are typical cases of animals* or that *red lights indicate the possibility of animals in the nearby area* or that *all animals have eight legs*, or whatever. In this case, intuition strongly recommends to conclude, simply enough, that that thinker does not have the concept *animal* after all. The same happens, *mutatis mutandis*, for whatever concept you may bring into view. This shows, very clearly on my view, that at an intuitive level we tend to confidently rely on the following conditional as regards concept possession:

(1) If $S$ has the concept $C$, then $S$ knows, at least to a certain degree, the content of $C$.

A correct reading of (1) must take into account the different sorts of content that concepts have, and therefore the different sorts of knowledge that are required for their possession. In this sense it is worth noting that not all concepts are like the concept *animal*. For instance, some concepts are logical concepts and therefore the kind of knowledge required for their possession is logical knowledge or knowledge of their logical contribution to propositional content. For such knowledge indeed, the caveat “at least to a certain degree” does not seem to make sense (see also fn. 3).

Under a widespread conception of content, knowledge of the content of a concept $C$ would be tantamount to knowledge of the contribution of $C$ to the truth-conditions of the proposition in which $C$ occurs. In other words, it would be knowledge of what it is for propositions of the form “$a$ is $C$” to be true. Neo-Fregean developments, to be sure, would be sympathetic to (1) interpreted in this way (see e.g. Evans 1982, Peacocke 1992). However, it is not my intention to pursue a neo-Fregean line of reasoning here. For our purposes, the intuitive level within which (1) is formulated is enough.
There are two reasons for this. Firstly, I want (1) to be neutral on the nature of the content that, according to it, must be known when a subject has a given concept. It need not be truth-conditional content. Conceptual content might be specified, for instance, just in terms of the information carried by the concept (as Dretske, Fodor, Millikan and others would defend)\(^1\). On the other hand, I think that the caveat “at least to a certain degree” makes a difference, one that is not obviously captured by neo-Fregean accounts. Granted that a subject knows what it is for a proposition \(p\) to be true, it is not obvious that we can make sense of that knowledge being \textit{to a certain degree}. Arguably, to have the concept \textit{animal} I need to know that dogs are animals or that sharks are. In contrast, it is doubtful that to have that concept I need to know that sponges (\textit{Phylum Porifera}) are animals. The degree to which, intuitively, we need to know the content of \(C\) for us to have the concept \(C\) is very surely a matter of convention. My point is simply that ascriptions of knowledge based on truth-conditional semantics, as they are usually formulated, do not obviously introduce degrees in the kind of knowledge required. In this respect it is crucial to make the distinction between the content of a thought grasped by a thinker and the meaning of the relevant sentence associated with that thought in natural language.\(^2\) For instance, while the meaning of the sentence ‘sponges are animals’ has the truth-value true, it might be that the content available of the thought \textit{sponges are animals}, when entertained by a particular subject, has, from the subject’s point of view, no particular truth-value to be assigned to, just because the subject does not know whether sponges are animals or not. In ideal circumstances the content of a concept and the meaning of the word associated with that concept do perfectly match. However, the intuition behind (1) suggests that there is in this respect a certain level of ignorance of the meaning of the word associated with the content of a concept that is compatible with possession of that concept. The distinction

1 Instances of informational theories include functional (e.g., Dretske 2000) teleological (e.g., Millikan 1993) and asymmetric-dependence approaches (e.g, Fodor 1990). In all of them, (conceptual) content is determined by the existence of a causal/functional relation between a property in the world and tokens of the concept in the subject’s head. Thus, on this view, the content of a concept can be determined without mention of truth conditions. More on this below.

2 A similar distinction is made by Gareth Evans (1982, chapter 3) between what a speaker says and the thought she intends to express. While the former is decidable in terms of linguistic conventions alone, the latter is so decidable, in addition, upon the thoughts, intentions and backgrounds beliefs of the thinker. This distinction allows Evans to fight down the impression that Kripke’s examples are counter-examples to the Russellian principle that to successfully think of an object we need to know which object it is that the thought is about. Evans’s conclusion is that even if it is possible to refer conventionally to an object without knowing which object is in question, it might yet not be possible to think of an object without discriminating knowledge of it.
between the content of a thought and the conventional meaning of the sentence associated with that thought in natural language, allows us then to make a rather obvious point, namely, that even if, as intuition suggests, we need knowledge of the content of the concept in order for us to have that concept, it is not further needed that we know the full conventional meaning of the word associated with the concept in order for us to have that concept. Accordingly, we can easily accommodate anti-individualist considerations (Putnam 1975, Burge 1979) as regards partially understood or misunderstood concepts. Obviously, that we need to know the content of the concept *animal* in order for us to have *animal* cannot mean that we need to be biologists in order to have the concept.3

As it stands, then, (1) is a very weak claim. On the one hand, it does not entail commitment to any particular semantics. On the other, when the question of possession of a given concept arises, it is only committed to relevant ascriptions of knowledge to a certain (surely conventional) degree.

2. Informational Atomism

That we confidently rely on (1) at an intuitive level means, of course, that at an intuitive level we are ready to accept that possession conditions for concepts are epistemologically constrained. As it happens, intuition is often misleading. In fact, naturalizing trends in the theory of concepts tend to deny (1). The idea seems to be that epistemic notions are not natural/scientific notions. Therefore, accounts in terms of epistemic notions are not satisfactory as natural accounts of concept possession. The clearest example of this position is Jerry Fodor (e.g., 1998, 2004, 2008). According to Fodor, the following conditional is not controversial:

\[(2) \text{If } S \text{ has the concept } C, S \text{ has the capacity to think of } C \text{ as such.}\]

However, this falls short of acknowledging something like (1). In fact, Fodor straightforwardly denies (1) since he holds a confederation of three theses incompatible with it: the Representational Theory of Mind (abbreviated RTM), Informational Semantics (IS henceforth),

\[\text{Note that there may be concepts for which, in contrast with natural kind concepts, it is not necessary to postulate, in this context, the existence of degrees of knowledge of the content of the concept. For instance, in the case of the concepts of some logical constants, like paradigmatically }\text{ conjunction, we can straightforwardly capture their content and possession conditions, as Peacocke has made explicit (1992, chapter 1), by means of the corresponding introduction and elimination rules.}\]
and Psychological Atomism (PSA for short). It is worth to unpack this philosophical position to get a clear idea about the Fodorian conception of concept possession.

Thus, according to RTM, concepts are just mental representations, that is, symbols with non-semantic as well as semantic properties in a language of thought apt for functional individuation. But to hold to RTM, Fodor argues, is then to hold to a metaphysical standpoint according to which concepts are a kind of mental particulars. On the other hand, the content of concepts is settled by IS, that is, by the information carried by concepts in virtue of there being a causal-cum-nomological relation between the concept and some property in the world. Finally, PSA says that concepts are in the great majority of cases primitive, i.e., that they lack internal structure. PSA then precludes the possibility that to have a concept consists, in the great majority of cases, in having any other concepts. The resulting picture is then as follows: concepts are mostly primitive mental particulars with an informational content. Trivially then, to have a concept is, in the great majority of cases, just to have a primitive mental particular with an informational content. Thus, the question as to whether someone possesses a given concept can be settled in its entirety without mention of the epistemological capacities putatively associated with that concept. The upshot is going to be that concept possession is not, as traditionally conceived, a matter of concept understanding anymore. Fodor (1998, p. 6) is explicitly endorsing claim (3):

(3) What concepts $S$ has is conceptually and metaphysically independent of what epistemic capacities $S$ has.

This confederation of theoretical frameworks (viz. the confederation of RTM, IS and PSA) is called by Fodor Informational Atomism (IA from now on.). According to IA, we are forced to the denial of (1) above. This is how Fodor puts it (1998, p. 124):

IA is explicitly non-cognitivist about concept possession; it says that having a concept is (not knowing something but) being in a certain nomic mind-world relation; specifically, it’s being in that mind-world relation in virtue of which the concept has the content that it does.

Fodor has characterized in a number of ways what in the above quote he describes as ‘being in a certain nomic mind-world relation’. For instance, he speaks of having a concept as ‘getting locked’ to the property expressed by the concept (e.g., 1998, p. 125) or as ‘resonating to’ the property that is expressed by the concept (e.g., 1998, p. 137). This terminological variety does not matter very much. They are just different ways of saying that
having a concept is having a mental particular which is in a certain symbol-world relation.

Fodor is not alone in defending an epistemologically free notion of concept possession. Any naturalizing approach to concept possession is likely to reject or otherwise question the epistemological requirements putatively associated to possession of a given concept. Roughly, the reason is that epistemological requirements are intentional and normative whereas natural psychological requirements arguably should not be. Thus, given theories like Fodor’s, our intuitions as regards (1) are under suspicion. Should we simply rule them out?

Well, I don’t think so. However, once theories like IA are brought into view, we cannot just endorse (1) without argument. As independent evidence in support of (1) I will offer an argument to the denial of (3). Specifically I will show that, from a plausible independent analysis of the epistemological relations that we bear to certain judgments, we very much need possession conditions for concepts that are epistemologically constrained. Under this view, possession of certain concepts are indeed crucial in understanding the nature of our justification in believing certain basic judgments. If this is correct, at least for some concepts, a theory that holds a thesis such as (3) will not be forthcoming.

3. Dogmatism

James Pryor has proposed a particular way of understanding the relation of justification that we bear to certain judgments, namely, dogmatism. There are many views in the spirit of dogmatism, but I will concentrate exclusively on Pryor’s account (2000, 2004). Dogmatism claims that we can acquire justification to believe a certain proposition \( p \) by the mere fact of having an experience that represents \( p \) as being the case. In particular, it claims that we do immediately acquire such a justification when we are faced with perceptually basic propositions as, for instance, the (presumably) perceptually basic proposition that there is a hand in front of me. Several things can be said as to what exactly is meant by “immediately acquiring justification”. In any case, I take the following two as being the fundamental: a) immediate justification in this sense means that it is not necessary that the

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4 This claim has exceptions such as the explicitly empiricist and pragmatist theories of concepts in which concept possession is understood as a kind of knowing how (see e.g., Prinz 2002).

5 From among the authors that have developed a similar position we find Alston (1986), Burge (1993, 2003), Peacocke (2004) and Davies (2004).
target justificatory status rests on any justification we may have for other propositions or on any other complementary or ampliative argumentation; b) having immediate justification counts as having a certain degree of *prima facie* justification, that is, justification that can be, also to a certain degree, defeated or undermined by additional evidence or, in the absence of such evidence, justification that may ultimately count, again to a certain degree, as *all things considered* justification.

Given this, there are many ways in which theories of perception may differ from dogmatism. It turns out however that they all make a similar theoretical move with respect to it: they add further conditions (besides experience itself) in order for perceptual justification to be met. For instance, reliabilist theories put the extra condition that our beliefs must be reliable. Coherentist theories, in contrast, would require as an extra condition the appearance of a mutually supporting relationship among our beliefs. Still others may add the further condition of some kind of a priori or non-perceptual knowledge about the reliability of our senses.

What are the advantages of holding dogmatism anyway? Well, as Roger White (2006) puts it, dogmatism has at least two fundamental and powerful virtues. In the first place, it seems to fit well with our pre-philosophical or common sense understanding of perceptual justification. For if there is no explicit philosophical complication, it seems natural to regard experience as the privileged basis when evaluating whether our beliefs about the world are justified. On the other hand, something in the path of dogmatism can be used to provide a philosophical response to skepticism. For if experience can provide with perceptual justification by itself, it is hard to see how the skeptic could undermine this justification already in place.

To briefly illustrate, these virtues—in the spirit of G. E. Moore’s celebrated proof of the external world—allow dogmatism to respond to traditional skeptical arguments based on skeptical hypothesis $H$ (that we are brains in a vat, that there is a misleading evil demon, etc.). It can do that because it offers a way of rejecting the following skeptical crucial premise: for every perceptual judgment $p$, in order to know that $p$ on the basis of a perceptual experience $e$, we need to know without begging the question that it is not the case that $H$. This premise is crucial because it demands independent justification that not-$H$ in order to being justified in the conclusion of, for instance, the Moorean argument: 1) It appears to me that this is a hand; 2) this is a hand; So, 3) there is an external world. Dogmatism can rule out this demand because, according to it, the mere fact that a subject has the relevant perceptual experience (e.g., the perceptual experience as of a hand) gives immediate *prima facie* perceptual justification to the belief in the properly related judgment (e.g., that this is a hand). So, if we have genuine
justification in relation to a perceptually based judgment —as in 2)—, we can fairly conclude whatever it follows from this perceptual judgment —as in 3) above.

When examining dogmatism, however, the fundamental question arises as to what kind of beliefs can be apt for applying its analysis of justification. Some of the beliefs we form by perception are clearly more epistemologically sophisticated than others. And arguably, epistemologically sophisticated beliefs, although perceptually based, cannot count as receiving the kind of justification that concerns dogmatism. For instance, the belief that there is a policeman ahead, entertained when I seem to see a uniformed person, or the belief that here comes a Ferrari Testarossa, entertained when I seem to see a sumptuous red car coming, are probably not of the required kind. Pryor claims that we have immediate prima facie justification for believing judgments if the propositions involved are ‘perceptually basic’ or are ‘basically represented’ (2000, p. 539). But, what is the criterion to discriminate between perceptually basic and perceptually complex propositions? Pryor suggests (2000, p. 547, n. 37) that such criterion is found in the “peculiar ‘phenomenal force’ or way our experiences have of presenting propositions”, one according to which “it ‘feels as if’ we could tell that those propositions are true -and that we’re perceiving them to be true- just by virtue of having them so represented”7. This phenomenal character of perceptual experience has been also stressed by authors like Heck (2000), who speaks of the presentational character of perceptual experience, and Burge (2003), who describes it as commital. However, as García-Carpintero (2005) has pointed out, a criterion based on this phenomenological aspect is not satisfactory. The reason is, simply enough, that this aspect of perceptual experience, which he labels its illocutionary force, can arguably be seen as being shared by all perceptual experiences, whether basic or complex.

To illustrate, imagine that I seem to see a blue-uniformed person and I thereby come to believe that there is a policeman ahead (so perhaps I cease speaking by the phone while I am driving). This is, I submit, clearly

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6 Dogmatism may not be correct as several authors have defended: e.g., Cohen (2002), Wright (2002) or White (2006). I cannot take this rival views into account here. However it is important to stress, as previously noted, that the typical theoretical move of those who disagree with dogmatism is to add further conditions, apart from perception itself, for perceptual justification to be met. The need for a distinction between perceptually basic and perceptually complex judgments will still be in place even if dogmatism were not correct.

7 Similarly, in 2004, pp. 357-358, Pryor claims that “[m]y view is that our perceptual experiences have the epistemic powers the dogmatist says they have because of what the phenomenology of perception is like” which he describes as “the feeling of seeming to ascertain that a given proposition is true”.

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a situation in which it feels as if I could tell that the relevant proposition (the proposition that there is a policeman ahead) is true and that I am perceiving it to be true just by my seeming to see a blue-uniformed person. To entertain the thought or to come to believe that there is a policeman ahead has depended in this case upon my seeming to see a blue-uniformed person and upon a certain amount of background information, e.g. the background information that policemen usually wear blue uniforms. So then, the proposition in question is complex. However, the phenomenal force of the perceptual experience is not diminished by this fact. It can be that, when I focus my attention on that person, I find out that the blue-uniformed person is just a painter. Then of course I cease believing there is a policeman ahead (and start speaking by the phone again). But yet, the phenomenal force of my perception when I seemed to see a blue-uniformed person, which clearly led me to believe that there is a policeman ahead, would not be diminished either by this fact. Similar cases can be made to arise as regards any other complex perceptual propositions. So the suggestion is that phenomenological considerations do not help in elucidating when dogmatist analysis are applicable.

4. Justification and concept possession

The putative difference between judgments for which we have immediate prima facie justification and those for which we don’t, is absolutely central in order to have a justified basis for dogmatism. Under a natural reading of the dogmatist proposal, one owed to García-Carpintero (2005), we find a plausible framework within which we can accurately make such a distinction. According to García-Carpintero, the relation of justification that we find between certain perceptual experiences and certain judgments can be seen as the relation of justification that comes from understanding or possessing the relevant concepts. Specifically, the basic perceptual experience that dogmatism requires can be considered as constituting, probably among other things, possession of a particular concept. Thus, under this interpretation, the criterion to discriminate between the perceptual experiences that give prima facie justification from those that do not comes from the fact that the former, but not the latter, are constitutive of the possession of a given concept.8

8 García-Carpintero’s main concern in the target paper is to present a project of moderate rationalism, located in the logical space between radical rationalism and radical naturalism. In this context,
For example, consider the concept *red*. To a first approximation, the possession conditions of the concept *red* can be stated as the capacity to draw or to accept the following kind of inferences: whenever a subject has the perceptual experience of something being red, she will be willing to judge that it is red; and also the other way around, whenever she applies the concept to an object, he will be willing to accept that the object in question (in ordinary cases of perceptual experience) has the appearance of being red.\(^9\) If this characterization is roughly correct, then it turns out that the perceptual experience as of red is constitutive of the conditions of a subject’s having the concept *red*. Hence, according to the proposal we are considering, when I see a (clear case of) red surface in front of me, the perceptual experience as of red would allow the dogmatist kind of justification as regards the judgment *this surface is red* because the perceptual experience involved is constitutive of possession of the concept *red*.

Note that this kind of move is not compelling for the case in which I seem to see a blue-uniformed person ahead and I thereby judge that *there is a policeman ahead*. The diagnosis is clear at this point, for even if it is presumably included some way or other in the possession conditions of the concept *policeman* that policemen usually wear blue uniforms, the perceptual experience of seeming to see a blue-uniformed person does not constitutively enter in the possession conditions of *policeman* (just in the same way as, say, the perceptual experience of seeing blue lights does not constitutively enter in the possession of the concept *police car*).

So it really seems that we are faced here with a promising way of deciding whether the dogmatist kind of justification is applicable or not.

As García-Carpintero puts it, this reasoning can be naturally extended to the case of logical knowledge, where intuition is to play the role of perceptual experience. The proposal is then that whenever the relevant intuition (e.g., the intuition as to the correctness of modus ponens) is constitutive of the possession of the relevant concept that appears in a judgment (e.g., the conditional judgment of any particular instance of modus ponens where the concept *modus ponens* implicitly occurs) we are thereby immediately

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\(^9\) Paralleling Peacocke’s presentation of the possession conditions for conjunction we can abbreviate this by saying that for a subject to have *red* is for her to have the capacity to draw or to accept inferences of the following form: \(x \text{ has appearance as of red}/Cx\); and \(Cx/x \text{ has appearance as of red}\).
and *prima facie* justified in believing that judgment. In accordance with our previous considerations (see Section 1), different sorts of concepts (viz. logical or perceptual) and their corresponding possession conditions involve different sorts of justificatory relations and knowledge. The elaboration of these ideas goes beyond the purposes of this paper. Suffice it to say that García-Carpintero’s proposal in this context points to an account both of perceptual and logical knowledge.  

5. Conclusion

If this way of interpreting dogmatism is correct, we get a picture according to which questions as to the analysis of justification clearly rely on questions as to the possession conditions of the relevant concepts. It turns out that theories along the lines of dogmatism lead us to the postulation of a link between the epistemic status of certain judgments and the possession conditions of certain concepts. As a result, we see now very clearly that dogmatism gives support to the following conditional with respect to some concepts, namely, those for which the relevant perceptual experiences constitute possession of them:

\[(4) \text{If } S \text{ has the concept } C \text{ and the perceptual experience } P \text{ constitutively enters in the possession conditions of } C, S \text{ is thereby immediately and } \text{prima facie} \text{ justified in believing a certain judgment } J \text{ (where } C \text{ suitably occurs) whenever } S \text{ takes } P \text{ at face value.} \]

As it stands, (4) might appear to be a rather complex condition. However it is not. It only says that, granted certain perceptual conditions and certain possession conditions for concepts, having a concept entails having (immediate and *prima facie*) justification for certain judgments. It is important to stress that we have not reached this conclusion from a direct analysis of the conditions for possessing concepts. We have reached this conclusion independently of the set of problems relative to concepts, by focusing on the nature of the epistemic status of certain perceptually basic propositions especially relevant in the context of anti-skeptical

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10 According to García-Carpintero, this extension of dogmatism to intuitive judgment not only precludes the possibility of radical forms of skepticism as regards logical knowledge, but also shows a promising way of avoiding Lewis Carroll’sregresses in the justification of logical rules and terms.

11 Note that the present considerations strongly suggest that in order to have a case of dogmatist justification, that is, immediate *prima facie* (although defeasible) justification, a subject needs to have certain concepts. The suggestion is then that the conditional (4) may go also in the other direction: if dogmatism applies, some relevant concepts are available to the subject.
arguments. But if (4) is correct, then patently concept possession cannot be conceptually nor metaphysically independent of the epistemic capacities of subjects. From among those capacities we should count, if anything, the justificatory relations that we bear to (some of) our (perceptually based) beliefs. Accordingly, what all this is supposed to show is that, at least for the concepts whose possession conditions are constituted by perceptual experiences, we are committed to the denial of (3). Fodor’s theory of concepts has to go.

The defender of Fodor’s IA might want to reply as follows: “OK, for some concepts, the conditional (4) holds. However, it needs yet to be shown that epistemic conditions are essential to concept possession. I claim that they are not, what’s the problem?” However, this reflection would be beside the point. For one might think that it is simply a contingent matter that (4) holds or else it might also be that (4) is true but not, as it were, in virtue of the essence of concepts. The fundamental point would be untouched. The point is just that, whatever concept possession is (in essence), at least for some cases, it is something conceptually or metaphysically dependent on epistemological constraints, in this case, the epistemic justificatory status of certain judgments. As things stand, if (4) holds, IA is clearly false. Mutatis mutandis, if IA is correct, (4) is false.

The defender of Fodor’s IA might yet unhesitatingly reply: “Look, what if epistemological theories have nothing whatever to do with theories of concepts? Arguably, there is no clear connection between issues relative to epistemology (which is a normative discipline) and issues relative to psychology (which is not normative). If that is so, we can do just good theory of concepts (which concerns thinking) without bothering much about epistemological theories (which concerns knowing). And if I don’t care much about epistemological theories, why should I care about dogmatist epistemological theories?” This sort of reply may seem well-grounded, but, as it happens, it is not. Even if at first sight epistemology and concepts are different things, most of what I have shown in this paper is precisely that there are points of connection which cannot be simply ignored without argument. It is certainly important to stress that, as it stands, (4) is conditional upon a particular theory of perceptual justification, namely, dogmatism. But, even if this is so, note that, as things actually stand, there is no easy way out for the defender of IA. For one thing, and as mentioned above, the typical theoretical move from those who disagree with dogmatism is to put further conditions, besides perception alone, in order for perceptual justification to be met. But note then that, if we accept the need of some such extra condition (e.g., knowledge of the reliability of our senses or the existence of a mutually
supporting relationship among our beliefs), the question still will arise as to when perception would give, granted this new condition, *prima facie* justification for a relevant judgment. And then the need for the distinction between perceptually basic and perceptually complex propositions will be equally in place. Accordingly, the suggestion is that something like (4) would be equally compelling even if, even though, dogmatism were not correct. Thus, it seems that for whatever particular epistemological theory you may bring into view, we are to find analysis of epistemic relations according to which epistemic conditions need to be derived, in a way or other, from conditions on the possession of at least some concepts. This should strike one as crucial, especially if we consider that Fodor himself —when speaking of the fact that IS is compatible with a reliabilist story about epistemic warrant— acknowledges that “the requirements that epistemology places upon epistemic warrant ought to be ones that the theory of content allows many of one’s beliefs actually to meet” (1998, p. 76). Of course, *a fortiori*, the requirements that epistemology places upon epistemic justification ought to be ones that the whole theory of concepts allows many of one’s beliefs actually to meet.

And yet for another thing, as we saw in Section 1, intuition strongly recommends something like (1), which was shown to be, in addition, a very weak claim. But note that while (4) is compatible with, indeed gives (philosophical) support to, (1), Fodor’s IA is incompatible both with (4) and with (1). As a result, we can be counted as having both intuitive as well as (independent) philosophical grounds for rejecting IA. Hence, the defender of IA has uncomfortable double duty and it is difficult to see how she could satisfactorily accomplish it. The long and short is that, since intuition and epistemology grant it, we should keep considering that thinking is, at least sometimes, a matter of knowing after all.

References


